BRITISH (DISGRACED) PM - TONY BLAIR

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Commander John Storm just wants to be left alone to complete his DNA collection, and explore the uncharted regions on planet earth. But he always seems to be in the wrong place at the wrong time.

The former (corrupt) UK Prime Minister, Sir Tony Blair KG, is taken hostage as part of the plan of the extreme activists to destroy all life on planet earth, to enable them to stage a Phoenix like comeback from the ashes, and takeover from the leaders they see as weak.

Blair was unrepentant for his part in murdering Saddam Hussein. Calling the intelligence blunders "little mistakes." Those blunders leading to the deaths of over a hundred thousand civilians. It reminds us of a much smaller and local incident in the UK, where the Leader of Wealden District Council, Valerie Chidson, had bulldozed an animal sanctuary, which stables were subsequently ruled lawful by the Planning Inspectorate on Appeal. But then the malicious council made no effort to repay the owners for their illegal demolition. Calling the mistakes "little ones."

What then is a "big mistake"? The British seem to sweep criticism as to illegalities under the carpet, routinely at all levels. Another example is the Post Office Horizon whitewash.

Red Dragon's plan, 'Operation Grand Slam,' will destroy all civilization, history and heritage from thousands of years of human endeavor. But they don't care about that. They just want to rule the world, and to rewrite history they way they want to see it written. Their plan is to write themselves in as the saviors of the world.

Working with other like minded cells, the extremists kidnap the Tony Blair and other world leaders with nuclear capability. Holding them hostage, until their evil plan comes to fruition. After which their fate will be decided. It doesn't look good for a world leader who was party to the fabrication of false evidence, so allowing the invasion of Iraq to proceed, to depose Saddam Hussein, who was not producing weapons of mass destruction. But the West wanted their cheap supplies of oil, and to send a message to the Arab world.

I'M PROTECTED & REWARDED BY A CORRUPT SYSTEM - Sir John Chilcot delivered a devastating critique of Tony Blair’s decision to go to war in Iraq in 2003, concluding that Britain chose to join the US invasion before “peaceful options for disarmament” had been exhausted. His report, which amounts to arguably the most scathing official verdict given on any modern British prime minister, concludes:

- Tony Blair exaggerated the case for war in Iraq
- There was no imminent threat from Saddam Hussein
- Britain’s intelligence agencies produced "flawed information"
- George Bush largely ignored UK advice on postwar planning
- The UK military were ill-equipped for the task
- UK-US relations would not have been harmed had the UK stayed out of the war

THE CHILCOT REPORT

THE GUARDIAN 6 JULY 2016 - TONY BLAIR UNREPENTANT AS CHILCOT GIVES CRUSHING IRAQ WAR VERDICT

Sir John Chilcot delivers highly critical verdict on Iraq war but ex-PM says: ‘I believe we made the right decision’.

A defiant Tony Blair defended his decision to go to war in Iraq in 2003 following the publication of a devastating report by Sir John Chilcot, which mauled the ex-prime minister’s reputation and said that at the time of the 2003 invasion Saddam Hussein “posed no imminent threat”.

Looking tired, his voice sometimes croaking with emotion, Blair described his decision to join the US attack as “the hardest, most momentous, most agonising decision I took in 10 years as British prime minister”.

He said he felt “deeply and sincerely ... the grief and suffering of those who lost ones they loved in Iraq”.

“There will not be a day when I do not relive and rethink what happened,” he added.

But asked whether invading Iraq was a mistake Blair was strikingly unrepentant. “I believe we made the right decision and the world is better and safer,” he declared. He argued that he had acted in good faith, based on intelligence at the time which said that Iraq’s president had weapons of mass destruction. This “turned out to be wrong”.

Blair also said the Iraq inquiry – set up by his successor Gordon Brown back in 2009 – shot down long-standing claims that he had lied about the war to the British public and cynically manipulated intelligence. Where there had been mistakes they were minor ones involving “planning and process”, he said. He said he “couldn’t accept” criticism that British soldiers died in vain.

Blair’s extraordinary two-hour press conference came after Chilcot, a retired civil servant, published his long-awaited report into the Iraq debacle. In the end, and seven years after hearings first began, it was a more far-reaching and damning document than many had expected. It eviscerated Blair’s style of government and decision-making.

It also revealed that in a remarkable private note sent on 28 July 2002 Blair promised Bush: “I will be with you, whatever.”

The head of the Iraq war inquiry said the UK’s decision to attack and occupy a sovereign state for the first time since the second world war was a decision of “utmost gravity”. Chilcot described Saddam as “undoubtedly a brutal dictator” who had repressed and murdered many of his own people and attacked his neighbours.

But he was withering about Blair’s choice to sign up to a military plan drawn up in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 by the US president, George W Bush, and his neo-con team. Chilcot said: “We have concluded that the UK chose to join the invasion of Iraq before the peaceful options for disarmament had been exhausted. Military action at that time was not a last resort.”

The report also bitterly criticised the way in which Blair made the case for Britain to go to war. It said the notorious dossier presented in September 2002 by Blair to the House of Commons did not support his claim that Iraq had a growing programme of chemical and biological weapons.

The then Labour government also failed to anticipate the war’s disastrous consequences, the report said. They included the deaths of “at least 150,000 Iraqis – and probably many more – most of them civilians” and “more than a million people displaced”. “The people of Iraq have suffered greatly,” Chilcot said.

Chilcot did not pass judgment on whether the war was legal. But the report said the way the legal basis was dealt with before the 20 March invasion was far from satisfactory. The attorney general, Peter Goldsmith, should have given written advice to cabinet and ministers – one of few findings that Blair accepted on Wednesday.

Lord Goldsmith told Blair that war without a second UN resolution would be illegal, only to change his mind after a trip to Washington in March 2003 and meetings with Bush administration legal officials.

Overall, Chilcot’s report amounts to arguably the most scathing official verdict on any modern British prime minister. It implicitly lumps Blair in the same category as Anthony Eden, who invaded Egypt in a failed attempt to gain control of the Suez canal. Chilcot’s 2.6m-word, 12-volume report was released on Wednesday morning, together with a 145-page executive summary.

The venue was the Queen Elizabeth II conference centre in Westminster. As families of service personnel killed in Iraq welcomed its strong contents, anti-war protesters kept up a raucous chorus of “Blair Liar”. 

THE REPORT CONCLUDED

- There was no imminent threat from Saddam Hussein.

- The strategy of containment could have been adopted and continued for some time.

- The judgments about the severity of the threat posed by Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction – WMDs – were presented with a certainty that was not justified.

- Despite explicit warnings, the consequences of the invasion were underestimated. The planning and preparations for Iraq after Saddam were wholly inadequate.

- The widespread perception that the September 2002 dossier distorted intelligence produced a “damaging legacy”, undermining trust and confidence in politicians.

- The government failed to achieve its stated objectives.

The Labour leader, Jeremy Corbyn, apologised for his party’s “disastrous decision to go to war”, calling it the most serious foreign policy calamity of the last 60 years. Jack Straw, the foreign secretary at the time, and who largely escaped Chilcot censure, said that Blair was never “gung ho” about war.

Other allies also came to Blair’s defence. Alastair Campbell, his former press secretary, said Blair had not given Bush a blank cheque. There were no easy decisions, Campbell added. In a statement on Wednesday Bush acknowledged mistakes but said he continued to believe “the world is better off without Saddam in power”.

The report, however, disagrees. It sheds fresh light on the private discussions between Blair and Bush in the run-up to war. The report says that after the 9/11 attacks Blair urged Bush “not to take hasty action on Iraq”. The UK’s formal policy was to contain Saddam’s regime.

But by the time the two leaders met in April 2002 at Bush’s ranch in Crawford, Texas, the UK’s thinking had undergone “a profound change”. The joint intelligence committee had concluded that Saddam could not be removed “without an invasion”, with the government saying Iraq was a threat “that had to be dealt with”.

I WILL BE WITH YOU WHATEVER

Blair sent Bush a series of private notes setting out his thinking. They included the 28 July 2002 note, released for the first time on Wednesday, in the face of opposition from the Cabinet Office, which said: “I will be with you [Bush] whatever.”

It added: “This is the moment to assess bluntly the difficulties. The planning on this and the strategy are the toughest yet. This is not Kosovo. This is not Afghanistan. It is not even the Gulf war.”

At times, Blair’s notes read more like stream of consciousness than considered policy documents. The note continued: “He [Saddam] is a potential threat. He could be contained. But containment … is always risky.” It says “we must have a workable military plan” and proposes a “huge force” to seize Baghdad.

Asked what “whatever” meant, Blair said on Wednesday his support for Bush was never unconditional or unqualified. He said that he had persuaded the US president to go down the “UN route”. Blair also linked his actions in Iraq with the ongoing global struggle against Islamist terrorism.

According to Chilcot, however, Blair shaped his diplomatic strategy around a “military timetable” and the need to get rid of Saddam. He told Bush in his note this was the “right thing to do”. Blair suggested that the simplest way to come up with a casus belli was to give an ultimatum to Iraq to disarm, preferably backed by UN authority.

Chilcot rejected Blair’s view that spurning the US-led military alliance against Iraq would have done major damage to London’s relations with Washington. “It’s questionable it would have broken the partnership,” he writes, noting that the two sides had taken different views on other major issues including the Suez crisis, the Vietnam war and the Falklands.

The report said that by January 2003 Blair had concluded “the likelihood was war”. He accepted a US military timetable for action by mid-March, while at the same time publicly blaming France for failing to support a second UN resolution in the security council authorising military action.

Chilcot was again unimpressed. “In the absence of a majority in support of military action, we consider that the UK was, in fact, undermining the security council’s authority,” he said.

The report also demolished Blair’s claim made when he gave evidence to the inquiry in 2010 that the difficulties encountered by British forces in post-invasion Iraq could not have been known in advance.

“We do not agree that hindsight is required,” Chilcot said. “The risks of internal strife in Iraq, active Iranian pursuit of its interests, regional instability, and al-Qaida activity in Iraq, were each explicitly identified before the invasion.”

The report is critical of the Ministry of Defence and military commanders who were tasked with occupying four southern provinces of Iraq once Saddam had been toppled. “The scale of the UK effort in post-conflict Iraq never matched the scale of the challenge,” Chilcot said, noting that security in Baghdad and south-east Iraq deteriorated soon after the invasion.

In the end, 179 British service personnel died before UK forces pulled out in 2009. Chilcot said the MoD was “slow in responding to the threat from improvised explosive devices”. He said that delays in providing properly armoured patrol vehicles “should not have been tolerated”. Nor was it clear which official was in charge. “It should have been,” Chilcot said.

As part of his remit, Chilcot also set out what lessons could be learned. He said that Blair “overestimated his ability to influence US decisions on Iraq”.

He added: “The UK’s relationship with the US has proved strong enough over time to bear the weight of honest disagreement. It does not require unconditional support where our interest or judgments differ.”

PROTECTED & REWARDED BY A CORRUPT SYSTEM - Don't worry old boy, we'll brainwash the public as usual. We must strike back at terrorist no matter how illegally. We write history as we want it to appear.

THE GUARDIAN 6 JULY 2016 - THE IRAQ WAR INQUIRY HAS LEFT THE DOOR OPEN FOR TONY BLAIR TO BE PROSECUTED

Sir John Chilcot’s inquiry has not, in his words, “expressed a view on whether military action [in Iraq] was legal”. That question, he said, could be resolved only by a court. Still less does his report deal with the question of whether Tony Blair or others should face legal action.

However, the Chilcot inquiry did find that the circumstances in which the Blair government decided that there was a legal basis for military action were “far from satisfactory”. The report said that Lord Goldsmith, the attorney general, should have been asked to provide written advice to the cabinet on 17 March 2003 explaining the legal basis on which the UK could take military action and setting out the risks of legal challenge.

In fact, Goldsmith started to give ministers an oral explanation, based on a written answer to a parliamentary question which was handed round the cabinet table, and the discussion then moved on.

Section 5 of the report – nearly 170 pages – is devoted to a detailed analysis of the legal advice given by Goldsmith and how it developed over time. Chilcot concluded that the cabinet was not misled by the attorney general on 17 March.

However, he said that ministers were being asked to confirm a decision that the diplomatic process was at an end and that the Commons should be asked to endorse military action. “Given the gravity of the situation,” says the report, “cabinet should have been made aware of the legal uncertainties.”

The report points out that no minister asked Goldsmith why the advice he had given 10 days earlier – that the safest legal course was to seek a second UN resolution – had changed. “There was little appetite to question Lord Goldsmith about his advice and no substantive discussion of the legal issues was recorded,” Chilcot finds. Goldsmith should have been asked to explain how it could be said that Iraq had reached the point at which it had failed to take the final opportunity offered by UN resolution 1441.

Publication of the Chilcot report is unlikely to put an end to calls for Blair and others to be prosecuted before the international criminal court (ICC). It’s argued that Blair should be charged with the crime of aggression, which includes a military attack or invasion not permitted under the UN charter.

More than a decade ago, the former ICC prosecutor explained that he had a mandate to examine conduct during the Iraq war “but not whether the decision to engage in armed conflict was legal”. Luis Moreno-Ocampo added: “I do not have the mandate to address the arguments on the legality of the use of force or the crime of aggression.” Since then, the crime of aggression has been defined in the ICC’s governing statute. However, this provision has not yet been brought into effect and will not be applied retrospectively. So there is no prospect of anyone facing charges of aggression arising from the Iraq war.

The ICC also has jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes committed by UK nationals after June 2002. The current prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, announced in 2014 that she was reopening a “preliminary examination” into allegations that British officials were responsible for “war crimes involving systematic detainee abuse in Iraq from 2003 until 2008”.

In her latest update last November, Bensouda said that in assessing whether “the alleged crimes fall within the jurisdiction of the court and were committed on a large scale or pursuant to a plan or policy”, she would take into account the findings of the relevant investigations conducted by the UK authorities.

A preliminary examination is not the same as an investigation. Its aim is to decide whether an investigation should be opened. The ICC prosecutor has said she will consider the Chilcot report before deciding whether to open a formal investigation. Announcing this on Monday, Bensouda said that a claim in the Sunday Telegraph that she had “ruled out putting Tony Blair on trial for war crimes” was inaccurate.

Bensouda has been kept informed on the progress of investigations by Ihat, the Iraq historic investigations team, and will take its findings into account. This is of immense importance because the ICC steps in only where the state concerned is “unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution”. This is known as the principle of complementarity.

Ihat has nearly 150 staff, including Royal Navy police and civilian investigators. No prosecutions have yet been brought as a result of their work but prosecutors considered bringing charges against two soldiers.

Latest figures supplied to me this week indicate that, by the end of May 2016, Ihat had received 3,363 allegations of potential criminal behaviour. After sifting out cases that did not amount to criminal offences, Ihat is now considering – or has considered – 325 allegations of unlawful killing and 1,343 allegations of ill-treatment, ranging from serious sexual assault to common assault. The figures refer to alleged victims.

Of these 1,668 allegations considered so far, 72 cases of unlawful killing and 18 cases of alleged ill-treatment have been – or are about to be – completed. Ihat has released details of some of its initial decisions. Ihat tells me that the allegation of criminal behaviour was “not sustainable” in 70 of the 72 cases of unlawful killing it has considered.

One allegation of unlawful killing by a soldier has so far been referred to the Service Prosecuting Authority, which takes charging decisions in the same way as the Crown Prosecution Service. The director of service prosecutions, Andrew Cayley QC, decided that there was insufficient evidence to prosecute. A second allegation of unlawful killing was referred to the RAF police for further investigation. Allegations of ill-treatment were also found to be unsustainable in 16 of the 18 cases considered.

One ill-treatment case was referred to the director of service prosecutions, who again decided that there was insufficient evidence to proceed. Another soldier who admitted ill-treatment was referred to his commanding officer for disciplinary action and fined £3,000. Video footage of an incident which showed him abusing an Iraqi man was provided to investigators by the Mail on Sunday.

Families of troops who died in the Iraq war are reported to be taking legal advice on whether Blair and others might face action in the civil courts. On Tuesday, General Sir Michael Rose, who has been advising the families, said action might be taken for what he called “malfeasance in a public office”.

Misconduct in public office is, in fact, a common law offence. The crime, which dates back to the 18th century, has recently been criticised for vagueness by the government’s law reform advisers. It may be committed when a public officer, acting as such, wilfully misconducts himself to such a degree as to amount to an abuse of the public’s trust in him and does so without reasonable excuse or justification.

Although parliament ratified the government’s decision to join the US-led invasion of Iraq, Blair comes in for heavy criticism from Chilcot. Blair presented judgments about Iraq’s capabilities “with a certainty that was not justified”. His conclusions about the aftermath of invasion “did not require the benefit of hindsight”. His omissions “reduced the likelihood of achieving the UK’s strategic objectives in Iraq”.

Blair did not establish clear ministerial oversight of post-conflict strategy. He did not ensure that ministers took the necessary decisions to integrate military and civilian contributions. He did not seek adequate assurances that the UK was in a position to meet its likely obligations in Iraq. He did not ensure that the UK’s strategic objectives were sufficiently tested. He did not press President Bush for assurances about US post-conflict plans. He did not consider whether the absence of such plans was a threat to UK strategic objectives or make post-conflict planning a condition of participation in military action.

Blair’s critics may believe that this amounts to the sort of wilful misconduct envisaged by the judges. On the other hand, authorisation by parliament must surely count as a “reasonable excuse or justification”.

Whether or not the courts would be willing to entertain a prosecution of a former prime minister for what may be seen as political failings, we can be sure that actions such as these were not in the minds of the judges when they developed the crime of misconduct in public office.

Tony Blair was advised of an aircraft anti-terrorist system, a British Patent application, but did nothing to investigate the possibilities of such a system with the military of civilian aviation authorities. He did though reply to a letter advising of the proposed development, that may be useful against other aggression, such as the September 11 2001, Al Qaeda attack on the Pentagon and Twin Towers.

[On top of that, the public may consider that the British honour system, sanctioned by the State, with the Queen as the Head of State, calls into question the level of corruption that Parliament has allowed to creep into the non-constitution that allows the Royals to sway the Courts, as surely as if they were sitting in the chamber with the Judges, saying nothing, but nevertheless, watching as a way of steering the so-called independence of the British Justice system. Reference: R v Sussex Justices, ex parte McCarthy 1924]

PROTECTED & REWARDED BY A CORRUPT STATE - More than half a million people have called on the government to rescind the knighthood given to Sir Tony Blair, but Keir Starmer has defended the former prime minister, saying the honour was deserved.

Is Tony Blair a worthy recipient of the Knight Companion of the Most Noble Order of the Garter? There is good and bad in all of us. Without doubt, Blair accomplished a good deal of things one might count as political successes, but he failed to tackle planning crime, and the judicial system is as unjust now as it was in his day. Equally, he failed to bring the law up to date to provide British subject with an Effective Remedy. And then, he pulled the flanker of all time, in effect lying to parliament and the people about the reasoning behind launching an attack on Iraq.

If that is rewarded with honours, then there is something seriously wrong with Britain and the thinking of those at the helm. And it is high time for a constitutional revolution, to get UK policies in line with the thinking of the electorate. The reason the Pilgrim Founding Father's striking out in the Mayflower, for America, was to rid themselves of European and British cruelties. As UK citizens cannot strike out like that for a fresh start, the only alternative is to disinfect our societal shortcomings, starting at the top for a national cure, working backwards or local authorities. This must be achieved via political means, by the voter, voting for change. And, to make that happen, we need honest candidates with decent policies. We need fresh faces, with high ideals, untainted by cronyist contact with the evils and comforts of the present system.

https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/jul/06/chilcot-report-crushing-verdict-tony-blair-iraq-war

https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/jul/06/iraq-war-inquiry-chilcot-tony-blair-prosecute

https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/jul/06/chilcot-report-crushing-verdict-tony-blair-iraq-war
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/jul/06/iraq-war-inquiry-chilcot-tony-blair-prosecute

CYBER WW3III CAST:

  SIR TONY BLAIR IS THE FORMER PRIME MINISTER UNITED KINGDOM WHO INVADED IRAQ BASED ON FABRICATED FLASE INTELLIGENCE AND FOR HIS WRONGDOING WAR AWARDED A KG BY THE CURRUPT BRITISH DESPITE MASSIVE PUBLIC OPPOSITION - IN THIS FICTIONAL POLITICAL THRILLER WHERE EXTREMIST PLOT TO EXTERMINATE ALL LIFE ON EARTH VIA A NUCLEAR HOLOCAUST - THE RISE AGAIN FROM THE ASHES TO RULE THE PLANET

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